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Abstract 
 
What Happened to Liquidity When World War I Shut the NYSE?  
 
 
 The suspension of trading on the New York Stock Exchange for more than 
four months following the outbreak of World War I fostered a substitute market on 
New Street as a source of liquidity. The New Street market suffered from a lack 
of price transparency because its transactions were not disseminated on the 
NYSE ticker and its quotations were blacklisted at the leading newspapers. This 
paper shows that despite the impaired information flow and the somewhat wider 
bid-ask spreads compared with the New York Stock Exchange, New Street 
offered economically meaningful liquidity services. The absence of price 
transparency turned an individual stock’s reputation for liquidity into an important 
variable in explaining the structure of bid-ask spreads on New Street. 
 2
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 It is not so surprising that the outbreak of World War I forced the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) to close. The threat of European liquidation of US 
securities probably justified a suspension in trading -- as a preventive measure or 
circuit breaker. It is surprising, however, that the Exchange remained shuttered 
for more than four months, from August 1, 1914 to December 12, 1914. 
Closing the Exchange for more than four months would be unthinkable 
today. It was also unthinkable in 1914.1 The only other time the NYSE 
suspended trading, other than to commemorate some departed dignitary, was 
during the Panic of 1873 when more than thirty Wall Street firms failed2.  Even 
so, according to Sprague [1910, p.13] the Exchange closed for only ten days in 
1873, from September 20 until September 30. In August 1914 the Exchange had 
to deal with only one failure.3   
How could the New York Stock Exchange remain closed for almost the 
entire second half of 1914? From the outset, the Wilson Administration wanted 
the Federal Reserve Banks in place before reopening the Exchange.4 Wilson’s 
                                            
1 Noble [1915, p. 87] says: “If at any time up to July, 1914, any Wall street man had asserted that 
the stock exchange could be kept closed continually for four and one-half months he would have 
been laughed to scorn.”  
2 The Wall Street Journal, August 4, 1914, reprinted a list of 33 New York firms that failed in 
1873, led by Jay Cooke & Co.  
3 Noble [p. 21] mentions only the failure of S. H. P. Pell & Co. The New York Times, September 
23, 1914, reports that three firms failed during this period. 
4 I develop this argument in “Birth of the Federal Reserve: Crisis in the Womb,” [in process]. The 
following quote from the New York Times on August 1, 1914 is instructive: “After a conference 
with the President, [Treasury] Secretary McAdoo expressed the belief that there should be no 
further serious delay in getting the new reserve bank system fully organized… The international 
character of the Federal Reserve banks under the new law is broad and flexible in the matter of 
dealing with gold coin and bullion…” The article goes on to say: “The closing of the New York 
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Treasury Secretary, William G. McAdoo, succeeded in keeping the Exchange 
closed until after the Reserve Banks opened (November 16, 1914), in part, 
because a liquid marketplace had emerged to accommodate trading. This liquid 
alternative, the New Street market, relieved the pressure to reopen the 
Exchange. 
The contemporaneous commentary frequently disparaged the New Street 
market. The Wall Street Journal [January 7, 1915] said: “The quotations that 
were made in New Street were no more legitimate than the quotations that were 
made in Belgium, where people with securities in their pockets, and fleeing from 
war and starvation, sold them for cash at thirty and forty percent discount to 
some itinerant peddler.” More recently, Friedman and Schwartz [1963, p.172fn] 
referred to New Street as an ‘outlaw’ market and Sobel [1968 p.344] called it a  
‘gutter’ market. 
New Street has been discredited largely out of ignorance. That ignorance 
stems from an effective campaign by the New York Stock Exchange during the 
trading suspension to suppress New Street prices. The NYSE Ticker did not 
disseminate New Street transactions. Henry Noble, President of the NYSE, 
successfully lobbied the leading newspapers of the day to embargo New Street 
quotations (see Noble [1915, pp.24-6]). The press satirized the legitimacy of New 
Street, and academics perpetuated the misrepresentation, because price data 
were unavailable publicly to refute the allegations. 
                                                                                                                                  
Stock Exchange was approved at the White house and the Treasury Department.” President 
Wilson succeeded in getting the Federal Reserve Board in place by August 10th but it took until 
November 16th for the regional banks to open for business. 
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  It turns out that the Exchange committee established to oversee NYSE 
business during the suspension closely monitored the New Street market. Their 
records provide bid and ask prices on stocks traded there. I have examined 
those quotes and found that New Street provided economically meaningful 
liquidity services despite somewhat wider bid-ask spreads on New Street 
compared with the NYSE. For example, New Street offered a two-sided market 
that dominated an alternative facility sponsored by the NYSE Clearing House 
more than sixty percent of the time.   
How can a market provide efficient liquidity services without price 
transparency? I will show that when price data are suppressed, market 
participants rely on other sources of substitute information. In particular, an 
individual stock’s ‘reputation for liquidity’ becomes an important determinant of a 
stock’s bid-ask spread.  Reputation often matters in the liquidity services 
business, especially for marketmakers and exchanges. The lack of price 
transparency on New Street extends the role of reputation to individual stocks. I 
estimate a cross-sectional model of bid-ask spreads on New Street showing that 
securities with an established reputation for liquidity had narrower spreads.  
Two objectives motivate this paper:  (1) To set the record straight about 
the effectiveness of the substitute market that emerged during the four-month 
closure of the New York Stock Exchange; (2) To show how a market with 
impaired price transparency overcomes its shortcomings. Section II explains the 
origins of New Street and Section III profiles its battle with the establishment to 
avoid suppression. Despite the attempts at muzzling New Street, Section IV 
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shows that New Street’s liquidity dominated the New York Stock Exchange’s 
Clearing House facility. The data also show that the wider spreads on New Street 
compared with the NYSE were not large enough to produce a measurable 
‘liquidity discount’ in stock prices.5 Section V presents the cross-sectional model 
of bid-ask spreads that highlights an individual stock’s reputation for liquidity as 
an antidote to the impaired flow of price information.   
 
II. The Birth of New Street 
 According to Noble [1915, pp.11-12], the Governing Board of the New 
York Stock Exchange voted to suspend trading less than fifteen minutes before 
the scheduled 10am opening bell on Friday, July 31, 1914. On that same 
morning the front page of the New York Times carried a headline that read: 
“Bankers Here Confer on War: Closing of Stock Exchange Not Necessary, 
Meeting at Morgan Offices Decides.” What happened between the meeting at 
Morgan offices (reported taking place late Thursday afternoon) and 9:45 Friday 
morning?  
Most observers believed that the Exchange closed because an overnight 
build-up of sell orders from Europe would pressure stocks downward.6 But the 
New York Times article just cited quotes an unnamed banker saying; “We think 
the Exchange should not be closed on account of the heavy European liquidation 
so long as there are buyers in the market.” And everyone knows that there are 
                                            
5 Amihud and Mendelson [1986] and Silber [1991] show that illiquidity has a potential negative 
impact on stock prices. 
6 The major European exchanges had already closed so that sales could not take place abroad. 
See footnote 11 for some contradictory evidence on whether prices would have declined had the 
NYSE opened. 
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always buyers at a price. Instead, pressure of another sort nailed the Exchange 
shut. At 9:30 on Friday morning, J. P. Morgan, Jr. relayed a message to the 
Exchange from Treasury Secretary McAdoo [1931, p. 290], suggesting that the 
NYSE close.7  
At the conclusion of the meeting on July 31st, Henry Noble, President of 
the NYSE, established the Committee of Five to oversee Exchange business 
during the suspension.8 Formal approval of the Committee of Five came in a vote 
by the NYSE Governing Board on August 3rd. The Committee started work 
immediately. It met with representatives of the Bank Clearing House regarding 
certifying checks drawn on Exchange members; it dealt with the issue of clearing 
transactions completed before the suspension of trading; and it confronted the 
problem of securities trading outside of the Exchange.         
 Efforts to circumvent the suspension of trading began that first weekend of 
August 1914. The New York Times carried an advertisement on Monday, August 
3, announcing: “Emergency Stock Market: Pending the resumption of trading on 
the New York Stock Exchange…we are prepared to buy and sell all classes of 
securities…” It was signed:  “New York Curb.”9 The confrontation dissipated the 
next day when the Wall Street Journal carried the following retraction: “No 
Dealings on the Curb: Advertisements which appeared in papers…are herewith 
                                            
7 Noble [pp. 12-13] protests too much when debunking the “false assertions…that [NYSE] 
members were unwillingly coerced by outside pressure.” 
8 Noble [p.12] says that he appointed Exchange members “H. K Pomroy, Ernest Groesbeck, 
Donald G. Geddes, Samuel F. Streit, with himself, to constitute the Committee.”  
9 The New York Curb Market Association normally traded securities not listed on the NYSE 
(referred to as unseasoned securities) outdoors on Broad Street, near the New York Stock 
Exchange. In 1921 it became the American Stock Exchange and moved indoors (see Sobel 
[1972]).    
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absolutely repudiated.” It was signed: E. R. McCormick, Chairman, New York 
Curb Association. 
 The regional stock exchanges were another logical venue for trading 
NYSE listed securities. Back then nearly every major city had a stock exchange 
of its own, trading securities of local companies as well as NYSE listed stocks. 
The New York Times reported on August 1st that all regional exchanges voted to 
close along with the NYSE.10 In addition, the Consolidated Stock Exchange, 
located in New York and trading primarily “odd-lots” of NYSE listed stocks, also 
closed on the morning of July 31.11  
 According to Noble [pp.34ff], a flood of communications inundated the 
Committee of Five to modify the trading prohibition. On August 5th the Baltimore 
Stock Exchange reported to the Committee that a member of the NYSE had 
“been guilty of going directly to the trust companies and making offerings of 
bonds.” The Committee responded [Noble, pp.34-7] that it would like the name of 
the member so that it could take appropriate action. Instead, on August 7 the 
Baltimore Stock Exchange urged the Committee to reopen the Exchange for 
bond trading. 
                                            
10 The Times reports that Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Detroit, Indianapolis, St. 
Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati, Columbus, Washington, and San Francisco all voted to close along 
with the NYSE, while Cleveland remained open (on July 31), but no business was done. 
Curiously, an announcement in the Wall Street Journal on September 4, 1914 states: “Cincinnati 
Stock Exchange: Did Not Suspend on August 1, But is Closed Now Until Further Notice.”       
 
11 The New York Times [August 1, 1914] reports that the Consolidated Stock Exchange opened 
(as usual) at 9:30 on July 31 but then closed at 10am when the NYSE voted to close. The New 
York Times also reported transactions in six stocks during that 30-minute trading session. Half of 
the stocks traded above the mid-point of their July 30 closing bid and offer and half traded below. 
Of the three that declined, only one stock fell by more than 2 percent.  For the origin of the 
Consolidated Exchange see Nelson [1907]. Its demise in 1926 is discussed in Sobel [1972].    
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 Noble [p. 38] admits that by August 11th “the growth of an unregulated 
outside market began to force itself upon the attention of the Committee.” He 
refers to the participants as “a group of mysterious individuals…seen loitering in 
New Street behind the Exchange.” But before long, Noble says [p.39], “this 
furtive little group developed into a good sized crowd of men who assembled at 
ten o’clock in the morning and continued in session until three o’clock in the 
afternoon.” Noble [p.40] was somewhat schizophrenic towards New Street. He 
recognized that “irregular dealing, as long as it remained within narrow limits and 
was not advertised in the press, furnished a safety valve;” but he then concludes: 
“the Stock Exchange authorities must do all in their power to hold the 
development of this market in check.” 
 The Committee of Five took a number of steps to restrain the New Street 
market (see Noble [p.40ff]). It barred the practice of some stock exchange 
members, who refrained from trading on New Street, but who indirectly helped 
the practice by clearing stocks for those who traded there. The Committee 
successfully persuaded the press to resist regular publication of New Street 
prices,12 although there were still occasional published reports of “the very low 
figures at which some leading stocks were quoted.” But the most important step 
to counter the New Street market was taken on August 12th when the Committee 
authorized trading through the New York Stock Exchange Clearing House at 
prices “no less than the closing prices of Thursday, July 30, 1914.” 
                                            
12 The Wall Street Journal [August 4, 1914] published Henry Noble’s denunciation of any attempt 
to establish quotations: “I must ask the newspapers of New York to cooperate with the officials of 
the Exchange in preventing these practices.” Noble [1915, p.26] congratulates the press on their 
cooperation. 
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 Noble reports [p.42] that with the trading floor closed, the NYSE Clearing 
House required “a large clerical force [to] tabulate the orders received and bring 
purchasers and sellers together who were willing to trade in similar amounts and 
at similar prices.”13 He goes on to say [p.43] that: “A very considerable amount of 
business began at once… [but] a little later this ‘Clearing House Market’ fell to 
the arbitrary minimum of the [July 30] closing prices…and the New Street market 
grew in proportion. During the darkest days of depression in prices…in the 
Street, …business in the Clearing House almost ceased. [When] New Street 
prices rose again to the Clearing House level a relatively small business on the 
‘outlaw’ market was transformed into a relatively large business conducted under 
the supervision of the Exchange.” 
  Noble’s observations are precisely what one would expect. Trading in 
‘black markets’ increase in proportion to the spread between market-clearing 
prices and ‘officially sanctioned’ prices. And New Street was, in fact, a black 
market. But how did Noble observe the relationship he describes between the 
relative trading volume on the two markets and relative prices without knowing 
what New Street prices were? Was he simply speculating based on ‘first 
principles’ or did he follow New Street quotations more closely than he admits? 
It turns out that Noble knew much more about New Street prices than he 
lets on in his “insider’s view of the crisis.”14 An examination of the Records of the 
                                            
13 Noble [p.42] quotes the Committee’s ruling as follows: “ Members of the Exchange desiring to 
buy securities for cash may send a list of same to the Committee on Clearing House…giving 
amounts of securities wanted and the prices they are willing to pay. Members of the Exchange 
desiring to sell securities…may send a list of same…giving amounts of securities for sale. No 
prices less than closing prices of July 30th, 1914 will be considered.”   
14 Noble’s opening paragraph in his book says: “At the present (1915), when the great 
events…are still close to us, even their details are vivid in our minds and we need no one to 
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Committee of Five reveals a collection of news clippings giving price quotations 
from the New Street market. 15
Stock prices were unavailable to the general public because none of the 
usual sources carried New Street quotes. The NYSE successfully restrained the 
New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle. But people really needing the information could find it. In particular, 
the news clippings pasted into the Committee of Five Records came from the 
Morning Telegraph, normally a “theater and turf paper.”16  Evidently, the New 
York Stock Exchange could not muscle the Morning Telegraph, which did not 
depend on Wall Street for regular news. Thus, the Morning Telegraph filled the 
void with a table of price quotations and descriptive commentary. 
 
III. A Profile of New Street 
 The New York Times [January 3, 1915] reviewed the activities of the New 
Street market as follows: “It furnished a market where stocks could be bought 
and sold by those who had especial need of liquidating their holdings or had 
money to invest…At the height of its activity, the New Street market consisted of 
                                                                                                                                  
rehearse them.  Time, however, is quick to dim even acute memories and Wall Street, of all 
places, is the land of forgetfulness. This being the case, it seemed to the writer of these pages 
that some record be kept…by one who happened to be very favorably placed to know the story in 
its entirety.” Noble is right that first-hand histories benefit from ‘inside information’ but they often 
suffer from the protagonist’s perspective. In this case, Noble’s ‘land of forgetfulness’ clouded his 
story.        
15 I would like to thank Steven Wheeler, Archivist at the New York Stock Exchange, for help in 
locating the Records and for providing copies of some of the entries. The Records total four 
binders, each of which is about one inch thick. They contain all of the public releases issued by 
the Committee but do not describe any of its deliberations. In addition to the published price 
quotations, the Records also contain news clippings reporting on the Committee’s activities. 
16 I would like to thank Mitchell Stephens of NYU’s Journalism Department for the reference to 
Frank Luther Mott [1950, p.658] which has a passing mention of the New York Morning 
Telegraph.   
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about thirty-five brokers who dealt for cash only. In the downward slant of prices 
in October, it was estimated that fully 40,000 shares a day were handled for a 
number of days, fairly well divided between 100 share lots and fractional 
amounts of stock. The average daily turnover during September, October and 
November was placed…between 8,000 and 12,000 shares.”17 By the time this 
relatively detailed description appeared in the New York Times, the New Street 
market had already disappeared. The need for its liquidity services evaporated 
on December 12, 1914, when the New York Stock Exchange reopened its 
trading floor to stocks.  
The New York Times was much less charitable towards New Street when 
the upstart market was alive. On October 7, 1914, the Times said: “Despite the 
wider publicity given quotations on transactions alleged to have been made in the 
street market, dealings in listed securities have not yet reached a scale that 
justifies the acceptance of prices made outside the Stock Exchange as a basis 
for buying and selling.” This self-serving description legitimized the Times’ 
suppression of New Street quotes, allowing the Morning Telegraph to step in. 
 The Telegraph usually published New Street bid / ask quotations on 
between 60 and 110 securities, compared with 100-150 securities quoted 
regularly in the New York Times before trading was suspended.18  The number of 
quotations on New Street depended primarily on the source. More than 100 
stocks were usually listed when the table cited: “Quotes by Beekman Underhill, 
                                            
17 NYSE volume for the same stocks traded on New Street averaged about 250,000 shares per 
day during the month prior to the trading suspension.  
18 Close to 600 stocks were listed on the NYSE in 1914. Van Antwerp [1913] reports 555 listed 
stocks in 1912 and 502 in1907. 
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16 Beaver Street. ” About 60 stocks appeared when Edward F. Breen (44 Broad 
Street) was the source. Attributions disappeared after September 23rd, most likely 
because the implicit penalties (see footnote 19 below) for providing ‘outlaw’ 
market quotations exceeded the benefit of free advertising. 
 Who were the people, referred to above by Noble as “a group of 
mysterious individuals,” that quoted prices and participated in trading on New 
Street? It is not surprising that neither Edward F. Breen nor Beekman Underhill 
were associated with the NYSE.19 The threat of sanctions for disobeying 
Exchange regulations surely deterred NYSE members from participating in New 
Street, although we saw above that the Committee of Five had to deal with 
collateral violations. But other markets had much less rigid control over their 
members (see [Sobel 1971, pp.3-4]).  
 Curb Market brokers and dealers were the most likely New Street 
professionals. First, they had the communication facilities needed to service 
market participants who lacked the timely price information normally provided by 
the NYSE ticker. The Morning Telegraph [August 25, 1914] comments: 
“…interest in the market …increased judging from the inquiries received… some 
of them coming by telegraph from distant points.” Second, when the New York 
Times published [January 4, 1915] its annual review of financial developments of 
1914, it included a table of ‘High and Low Prices’ on New Street compiled with 
the help of “quotations supplied directly to the Times by George S. Crap, a dealer 
                                            
19 The membership list of the New York Stock Exchange for 1914 contains neither name. Breen 
applied for membership at the NYSE in1922 but his meeting before the Committee on 
Admissions was cancelled on June 8th. No explanation was given for the cancellation, but given 
the “clubby” nature of the Exchange, it would not be surprising if Breen’s price quotations for New 
Street worked against his admission prospects.     
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in outside securities [my italics] who participated in New Street trading.” The 
Times regularly published quotes from the Curb under the heading “Outside 
Securities” when the exchanges were open. Thus, the reference to George Crap 
as ‘a dealer in outside securities’ identifies him as a member of Curb. Third, we 
know that at least some Curb members placed an advertisement on August 3rd 
suggesting that the Curb Market Association would trade NYSE securities during 
the suspension. Finally, Curb Market participants were accustomed to conducting 
business in the open air, while battling the elements. New Street posed no 
unanticipated weather-related complications for Curb Market dealers.  
 The Consolidated Stock Exchange must have also supplied New Street 
with brokers. Members of the Consolidated Stock Exchange were already 
accustomed to trading odd-lots of NYSE stocks, since that was their normal 
business. Without these participants it would have been too easy for the 
Committee of Five to blame the Curb Market Association for de facto violating the 
ban on trading NYSE securities. Moreover, the Consolidated Stock Exchange led 
the lobbying for a resumption of trading.20  
 
IV. Liquidity on New Street: An Overview 
 
 The contemporaneous commentary discussing New Street differs over the 
quality of liquidity services provided there. The Wall Street Journal dismissed 
New Street from start to finish. At the other extreme, Noble observed that as 
early as August 11th New Street trading had become sufficiently important to 
                                            
20 On August 27, 1914 the Wall Street Journal reported that the Board of Governors of the 
Consolidated Stock Exchange held a meeting for the purpose of considering the question of 
reopening the exchange.      
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attract attention from the Committee of Five. We know from the Committee’s 
Records that by August 25th they monitored New Street quotes published by the 
Morning Telegraph. Somewhere in the middle sits the New York Times, which 
recognized significant improvement over time. For example, on November 13th 
the Times signaled the arrival of bullish sentiment in the marketplace by noting:  
“A demonstration of the demand for listed stocks was given by the dealings in 
New Street, where prices scored gains.” The Times then lists a table of 27 stocks 
traded on New Street showing the price change from the previous day. This is 
quite a turnaround from their October 7th rejection (see above) of New Street 
transactions.  
The bid /ask quotes reported by the Morning Telegraph and preserved in 
the Records of the Committee of Five provide an opportunity to examine New 
Street liquidity more formally. The Telegraph did not report any trading data nor 
did it report the size of transaction that could be accommodated at the quoted bid 
and ask. Thus we focus on the immediate execution dimension to liquidity as 
measured by the spread between the bid and ask quotes.21 Narrow spreads 
imply a more liquid market.   
Quotations are available in the Committee’s Records for a total 28 days 
between August 25 and October 26, the ‘early period’ when New Street liquidity 
was under most suspicion. A total of 117 securities were quoted at least once 
during the period. We restrict our analysis to a sample of 71 stocks that had 10 
                                            
21 See Stoll [2000] for a discussion of the quoted spread and other dimensions to liquidity. 
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days or more of bid / ask observations and had data available from the NYSE 
prior to the suspension of trading.22  
Table 1 displays data for a total of twenty stocks in our sample: The first 
ten stocks have the lowest average bid-ask spread in New Street over the 
sample period and the last ten stocks have the highest average spread. The 
spread is measured in percent:  
[(Pa  - Pb ) / (Pa   + Pb )/2] * 100,  
where Pa is the ask price and Pb is the bid price.  
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the stock’s daily average spread on New 
Street during the sample. For example, the first entry in column 1 shows that the 
average spread for Reading Railroad was .437 percent on New Street. The last 
entry shows that Rumely had an average spread of 15.54 percent. Column 2 
provides the daily average spread for the same companies when they traded on 
the NYSE during a 28-day period ending with July 29, 1914.23  
For the entire sample of 71 securities, the average spread on New Street 
is 2.47 percent compared with a spread of 1.34 percent on the NYSE.24 The 
increase in spreads is not surprising, given the impaired flow of New Street’s 
price information. A key question is whether the increased spreads were large 
                                            
22 The 46 securities that were disqualified include, 37 that had fewer than 10 observations, six 
that lacked a complete set of data from the NYSE, two that showed no change in either bid or 
offer price over the sample period, and one that was a bond.  Almost all of the 37 stocks with 
fewer than 10 observations were not quoted when Edward F. Breen was the data source in the 
Morning Telegraph.  
23 The NYSE sample ends on July 29, excluding the day before trading was suspended. July 30 
was abnormally active and might have distorted the pre-suspension sample.  
24 The averages in Table 1 are mean spreads. Median spreads are usually smaller for stocks on 
both New Street and the NYSE. For example, the median spread on New Street is 2.31 percent 
and the median spread on the NYSE is 1.18 percent. The qualitative comparisons between New 
Street and the NYSE are the same for mean and median spreads.    
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enough to cause a measurable ‘liquidity discount’ in stock prices (see Amihud 
and Mendelson [1986] and Silber [1991]). The Wall Street Journal parodied New 
Street by saying that it resembled a market where stocks traded at “a thirty or 
forty percent discount.” What are the facts?  
For each of the 28 days in the New Street sample I calculated the average 
return for each stock compared with the closing price on July 30 (the last day of 
trading before the suspension).25 I then formed a series of equally weighted 
returns for all stocks compared with the July 30 close for each day of the sample. 
Those numbers are plotted in Figure 1. The data show that the price decline on 
New Street was negligible during the last few days in August and then fluctuated 
about 2 ½ percent below the July 30 close during September. The decline 
reached a little less than 9 percent in the last few days of October. The New York 
Times article cited above ascribed “the downward slant of prices in October” to 
depressing war news 
The average price decline on New Street cannot be explained by the 
increase in bid-ask spreads. The decreases are very small during August and 
much of September, especially when we recall that the NYSE suspended trading 
on July 31st because of a rumored build-up in sell orders from Europe. 26  Nothing 
resembling the thirty and forty percent discount alleged by the Wall Street 
Journal ever occurred. The increased bid-ask spreads on New Street evidently 
                                            
25 I used the mid-point of the bid-ask spread to represent the price on each day of the New Street 
sample.     
26 The standard deviation of daily returns is 1.42 percent for the equally weighted portfolio for the 
sample period ending July 29th. The price declines in late August and early September compared 
with July 30 are statistically insignificant.   
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were not large enough to produce a measurable ‘liquidity discount’ in stock 
prices. 
The contemporary disagreement discussed above over New Street’s 
importance raises the question of whether New Street offered economically 
relevant liquidity services despite the wider bid-ask spreads. Were there trading 
opportunities provided on New Street that would not have been otherwise 
available? 
Recall that starting August 12th investors had the alternative to transact 
through the NYSE Clearing House at July 30 closing prices (or higher). The 
imprimatur of the New York Stock Exchange gave the Clearing House an 
important natural advantage over New Street. The problem with the Clearing 
House, on the other hand, was that it did not provide a two-sided market when 
there were more potential sellers than buyers at July 30 closing prices. 
 A two-sided market means that both a bid price and ask (offer) price are 
quoted so that potential sellers can hit bids and buyers can lift offers if they wish 
to transact immediately.  It was always possible to buy immediately in the NYSE 
Clearing House from the available offers (either at or above July 30 closing 
prices), but it was not always possible to sell there because bids below July 30 
were not permitted. Moreover, although a trader could always buy at the Clearing 
House from a seller at the July 30 close, the price would be ‘too high’ if the 
market-clearing equilibrium were below that level.  
New Street quotes were always two-sided, even for the least liquid stocks. 
Thus if there were sellers only at the Clearing House and no buyers, some of 
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those potential sellers could dispose of their securities at the quoted bid prices on 
New Street. This disposal facility was an important liquidity service. However, 
potential sellers would be uncertain if the low bid price stemmed from a decline in 
the equilibrium price or was simply a reflection of the relatively wide bid-ask 
spreads on New Street.  
When both the bid and offer on New Street were below the July 30 closing 
price, the New Street market dominated the NYSE Clearing House for both 
potential buyers and potential sellers. Moreover, under those circumstances the 
low bid prices gained credibility from the accompanying low offer prices. 
 I calculated the difference between the July 30 closing price and the ask 
price for each stock on every day of the sample. Both the bid and offer dominate 
the July 30 close when that difference is positive (because bids are always below 
offers). Days% measures the percentage of days in the sample for which ‘the 
July 30 close minus the offer’ is positive for each stock. The average value of 
Days% for the entire sample is 63.57. Thus, New Street stocks provided a two-
sided market that dominated the NYSE Clearing House about 63 percent of the 
time.  Forty-six of the seventy-one stocks on New Street had a value for Days% 
greater than 50 percent.  
These results show that New Street offered liquidity services that were 
meaningful despite wider bid-ask spreads compared with the New York Stock 
Exchange. 27 New Street still had to overcome the NYSE trademark enjoyed by 
                                            
27 The New York Times [August 2, 1914], reports that short sellers complained that the trading 
suspension would rob them of their profits if the NYSE were not reopened until after prices 
recovered. Shorts had the opportunity to close out their positions profitably when offer prices on 
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the Clearing House. The economic incentive to shift order flow to New Street 
should be greatest for stocks with large price level discounts on New Street 
compared with the July 30 close on the NYSE and for stock’s with large values of 
Days%. The shift in order flow should help explain the structure of bid-ask 
spreads across stocks on New Street. 
 
V. A Model of Bid-Ask Spreads on New Street: The Role of Reputation   
The disparity in bid-ask spreads on New Street versus the NYSE in Table 
1 is much less pronounced for the most liquid stocks on New Street. In particular, 
the average spread for the ten most liquid New Street stocks in Table 1 is .574 
percent compared with an average spread of .403 percent for those same stocks 
when they traded on the NYSE. On the other hand, the average spread for the 
bottom ten in the table is 6.82 percent on New Street compared with an average 
spread of 3.1 percent when these relatively illiquid stocks traded on the NYSE. I 
estimate a model of the structure of bid-ask spreads on New Street to explain 
this cross sectional behavior of spreads and to see how spreads respond to the 
economic incentives just described. 
Stoll [2000] reviews the extensive literature on bid-ask spreads and 
individual firm characteristics. Order processing and inventory considerations 
lead to the following cross-sectional empirical relationship: 
 
(1) S = a0  + a1 log V + a2 SD + a3 log P + e.  
                                                                                                                                  
New Street were below the July 30 close. Short sellers were, therefore, among the important 
beneficiaries of two-sided New Street liquidity.     
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 S is an individual stock’s average percentage spread over some time period, V is 
the average dollar volume of trading in the stock during that time period, SD is 
the stock’s historical standard deviation of returns, P is the average price level of 
the stock during the time period, and e is an error term.   
Inventory risk associated with marketmaking in stocks implies that a stock 
with higher trading volume has a narrower spread because high volume permits 
traders to return quickly to a zero inventory position. A stock with a larger 
standard deviation of returns has a wider spread because greater volatility 
means any non-zero inventory position is riskier. A lower priced stock has a 
wider percentage bid-ask spread because of discreteness in price quotations (1/8 
was the minimum price change in 1914). Market capitalization sometimes 
appears in equation (1) as an additional proxy for risk.     
 Least squares estimation of equation (1) with contemporaneous cross-
sectional data on volume and spreads is inappropriate because volume of trading 
and spreads are simultaneously determined. Higher volume leads to lower 
spreads because of dealer inventory behavior but lower spreads attract higher 
volume because of public investor behavior. It is also impossible to estimate 
equation (1) for New Street because the Morning telegraph did not publish 
trading volume. One solution to the estimation problem is to replace volume on 
New Street with a set of instrumental variables. 
 Volume of trading on New Street should respond to the economic 
incentives to trade there versus in the NYSE Clearing House. The incentive to 
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trade on New Street should be positively related to the magnitude of the 
difference between the July 30 closing price and the ask price on New Street. As 
suggested above, large positive values for that differential mean that New 
Street’s two-sided market dominates the NYSE Clearing House by a lot, implying 
a greater incentive to shift order flow to New Street. For each stock, PminAsk 
measures the average value during the New Street sample of the July 30 closing 
price minus the ask price, expressed as a percent of the ask price.28 Higher 
values for PminAsk should bring larger volume to New Street, implying lower bid-
ask spreads.     
The impaired dissemination of price information on New Street suggests 
that stocks that have a reputation for liquidity on New Street should also have 
higher order flow. We know that reputation matters in the liquidity services 
business. Silber [1984, p. 941] describes how marketmakers continuously quote 
a two-sided market to foster a reputation for liquidity so they can attract order 
flow. Exchanges with an established reputation for liquidity succeed against 
competitors, in part, because brokers have a fiduciary responsibility to send order 
flow to the most liquid market. In our case, the absence of price transparency on 
New Street makes liquidity a function of an individual stock’s reputation for 
liquidity.   
Stocks with a two-sided market that dominates the NYSE much of the time 
gain a reputation for liquidity on New Street. Hence, the Days% variable, 
measuring the fraction of days with positive values for PminAsk, should serve as 
                                            
28 The average value of PminAsk for each stock is a calculated after setting any daily negative 
value equal to zero since all negative values imply a zero incentive to trade on New Street.    
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a proxy for each stock’s reputation for liquidity on New Street.  Stocks with larger 
values for Days% should attract larger order flow, implying narrower bid-ask 
spreads.  
Replacing log V in equation (1) above with PminAsk and Days% produces 
the following equation that can be estimated with ordinary least squares: 
 
(2) S = b0  + b1 Days% + b2 PminAsk + b3  SD +  b4  log P + e.  
 
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the results of estimating equation (2) with the 
average percentage spread on New Street for each stock as the dependent 
variable. The independent variables, in addition to Days% and PminAsk, are:  
SD, the stock’s standard deviation of returns on the NYSE during the 28-day 
period ending July 29, 1914; and P, the stock’s price level measured by the 
average of the bid-ask midpoints during the New Street sample. The results 
show that Days% has an expected negative coefficient that is statistically 
significant, but PminAsk is insignificant and has the wrong sign. P enters with the 
correct, statistically significant, negative coefficient and SD enters with the 
correct positive coefficient but is not significant.   
The result for the Days% variable implies that stocks have lower average 
bid-ask spreads when they have a reputation for providing a two-sided market on 
New Street that dominates the NYSE Clearing House. The average bid-ask 
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spread does not respond to the magnitude of PminAsk,29 perhaps because of the 
impaired price transparency on New Street.  
An additional indicator of a stock’s reputation for liquidity is persistently 
high historical trading volume. Average volume of trading on the NYSE prior to 
the trading halt should reflect a stocks long-term reputation for liquidity and is an 
appropriate added instrument for New Street volume.30
 Column 2 of Table 2 shows the results of a least squares 
estimation of equation (2) with V, the stock’s average daily dollar volume on the 
NYSE during the 28-day period ending on July 29, 1914, added to equation (1). 
Volume is statistically significant with the expected negative sign, Days% has the 
correct negative sign but is no longer statistically significant, and PminAsk 
continues to have an incorrectly signed insignificant coefficient.31  
 These results confirm that the impaired dissemination of New 
Street price information provides a special role for an individual stock’s reputation 
for liquidity in explaining spreads. The statistical significance of historical NYSE 
volume, especially compared with Days%, implies that a stock’s long-term 
reputation for liquidity is more important than its more recently acquired 
reputation when markets lack price transparency.  
                                            
29 A number of alternative specifications of PminAsk were tried: (1) The average value of 
PminAsk was calculated for each stock without setting negative days equal to zero; (2) The ask 
price was replaced with the midpoint of the bid and ask; (3) Log PminAsk was used (after 
replacing zero values with .0001). None of these alterations changed the result that PminAsk was 
statistically insignificant.   
30 Note that average volume on the NYSE prior to the trading suspension has no necessary 
linkage to the purely economic incentive to shift order flow to New Street. The correlation 
coefficient between volume and PminAsk is -.02. Thus if historical NYSE volume explains the 
structure of spreads it is purely a reputation effect.        
 
31 Market capitalization was tried in both equations 1 and 2 but had the wrong sign and was not 
statistically significant. 
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 VI. Conclusion 
 It is easy to understand why New Street emerged almost immediately after 
the suspension of trading on the New York Stock Exchange following the 
outbreak of World War I. Few economic activities are as reliable as attempts to 
circumvent regulation. It is impressive, however, that the New Street market 
provided economically meaningful liquidity services despite extensive efforts to 
stifle its operations. 
 New Street survived competition from the NYSE Clearing House facility, it 
overcame disparaging newspaper publicity that denigrated the quality of its 
product and it survived efforts to muzzle the dissemination of crucial price 
information. It is disappointing that academics have perpetuated the myth of New 
Street’s ineffectiveness by using pejoratives like ‘gutter’ and ‘outlaw’ to describe 
the market. New Street’s reputation should, at least, reflect the fact that its 
liquidity dominated the NYSE Clearing House more than sixty percent of the 
time.  
 The cost of transacting on New Street suffered somewhat from the 
impaired flow of price information but responded to a stock’s reputation for 
liquidity. Reputation always matters in the liquidity services industry but it 
becomes especially important when markets lack transparency.     
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  Table 1  
 
Bid-Ask Spreads on New Street and the NYSE  
 
 
 
 
      (1)      (2) 
Stock New Street      NYSE 
Reading Railroad 0.437 0.091
Union Pacific RR 0.490 0.100
Consolidated Gas Co.                  0.504 0.705
Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe RR 0.570 0.315
Great Northern RR   preferred 0.571 0.341
Norfolk & Western RR 0.591 0.561
American Tel & Tel 0.637 0.353
Chicago and Northwestern RR 0.640 1.061
Pennsylvania RR 0.641 0.258
Northern Pacific RR 0.659 0.248
      
Colorado Fuel & Iron 4.105 3.013
Distillers Securities Corp 4.358 5.304
Guggenheim Exploration 4.603 0.807
Kansas City Southern RR 4.741 2.058
Pressed Steel Car 5.446 1.477
Pittsburgh Coal 5.447 3.134
International Paper preferred 5.606 1.946
Virginia Carolina Chemical 9.039 1.453
Corn Products 9.339 4.111
Rumely Co. 15.540 9.765
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Table 2 
Cross-Section Regressions Explaining New Street Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept    8.296    4.206   10.190    5.516 
Day %   -  .015  - 2.656   -   .008 -  1.408 
PMinAsk      .014      .081       .191    1.101 
Log P  - 1.454 -  3.519   -   .799 -  1.954 
SD  26.326    1.356   45.717    2.507 
Log V --- ---   -   .526 -  3.959 
 
 
Adjusted R2
 
 
      .508 
  
 
     .595 
 
Observations        71        71  
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Figure 1 
 
                               New Street Price Level Versus NYSE July 30 Close  
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